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REPRESENTING VETERANS
Jennifer D. Oliva *
ABSTRACT
Federal law has long deprived American veterans of certain fundamental legal rights
enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice. Federal case law, for example,
denies veterans the right to bring an action in tort against the federal government to
vindicate in-service injuries. And the United States Code deprives veterans of their right to
robust judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) service-connected benefit
decisions. This pair of due process deprivations is compounded by the federal statute that
prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage
of the VA claims process. This Article examines the federal statutory scheme and pertinent
case law that has long denied veterans the right to counsel throughout the VA veteran
claims adjudication process, debunks the rationales underlying that law, and concludes by
recommending that the federal government extend to veterans the right to counsel
throughout the VA’s benefits adjudication proceedings.
“What an irony that the veterans who have fought to see that we all have
these legal rights, are the very ones who are being denied those rights now.” 1
I. INTRODUCTION
It is important to concede up front that the task at hand—the diagnosis and
treatment of the singular most formidable legal challenge currently faced by
American veterans—is beyond the capacity of this Article. The litany of ways in
which federal law deprives our former service members of fundamental legal rights
enjoyed by non-veterans and attributable to veteran sacrifice makes it impossible
to reasonably choose just one culprit. More frustrating, the purportedly “proveteran” American public appears either unaware of—or unconcerned about—the
law’s anomalous treatment of veterans insofar as basic due process rights are
concerned. As United States Marine Corps veteran and law professor Andrew
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D., Georgetown
University; M.B.A., University of Oxford; B.S., United States Military Academy. This Article is
dedicated to the brave Americans who have selflessly served our nation in the United States Armed
Forces.
1. S. 11, The Proposed Veterans’ Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, and
S. 2292, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 100th Cong. 47
(1988) (statement of Sen. Thomas A. Daschle).
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Popper has explained, “Service members are routinely called heroes—and they are.
It is the highest public calling. Yet these gestures seem, at best, incomplete when
accompanied by a deprivation of . . . the basic rights due to all citizens.” 2
Federal case law, for example, has stripped veterans of the right to bring a cause
of action in tort against the federal government to vindicate injuries incurred in
service. Title 38 of the United States Code also denies veterans the right to robust
judicial oversight of Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) decisions denying them
their hard-earned, service-connected benefit entitlements. These unjustified,
veteran-centric due process deprivations are compounded by the federal statute
that prohibits veterans from exercising the fundamental right to counsel during
the initial stage of the VA claims process. This Article, therefore, argues that the
federal statutory scheme and pertinent case law that have long denied veterans the
right to counsel throughout the VA’s veterans’ claims adjudication process are
ripe for reform.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II explains the federal doctrine that
denies veterans the right to bring a private cause of action to remedy in-service
injuries caused by the federal government’s tortious conduct. Part III details the
genesis of the federal law that denied veterans the right to judicial oversight of
VA’s service-connected claims decisions until recently and examines the ongoing
inadequacy of the current veteran judicial review scheme. Part IV provides an
overview of both the legacy and newly enacted veterans’ service-connected
disability claims processes. It then explores the historic—and bogus—rationales
underlying the nation’s long-standing refusal to extend the right to counsel to
veterans during VA claims adjudication proceedings. Part V concludes this Article
by recommending that federal law be reformed to extend the right to obtain legal
representation to veterans during the initial stage of the VA claims process and
offering myriad arguments in favor of that proposal.
II. THE RIGHT TO BRING A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
Unlike their civilian counterparts, service members and veterans are deprived
of the basic right to bring civil lawsuits against the government to vindicate
particular injuries. The plain language of the 1946 Federal Torts Claims Act
(FTCA) extended to all persons the right to bring civil suits against the federal
government for injuries inflicted by the sovereign’s negligent and intentional
tortious conduct, including rape, sexual assault, battery, medical malpractice,
torture, and murder. 3 Four years after the FTCA was enacted, however, the
Supreme Court held in Feres v. United States that the federal government was
immune from suit brought by current and former members of the armed forces
who had incurred injuries “incident to [military] service” because, among other
things, such suits would adversely affect military order and discipline. 4
2. Andrew Popper, Rethinking Feres: Granting Access to Justice for Service Members, 60 B.C. L.
REV. 1491, 1498 (2019) (footnote omitted).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2402, 2671–2680 (2018) (originally enacted as
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 812, 842–47 (amended
2006)).
4. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
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As one veteran commentator has noted, “The force of [Feres] was apparent
immediately: most [service members] injured incident to military service would be
denied access to the very system of justice they pledged to defend.” 5 The Feres
doctrine’s seven-decade reign of injustice has well-fulfilled that prediction.
Imagine a scenario in which a group of civilians and service members developed
life-threatening diseases due to their exposure to harmful toxins emitting from a
military installation proximate to their respective residences. Under current law,
the affected civilians would be entitled to initiate an FTCA action against the
Department of Defense to recover for their injuries, but similarly situated service
members would be entirely precluded from bringing suit. Worse yet, the lower
federal courts have applied the Feres doctrine to bar current and former service
members who have been raped or otherwise viciously assaulted in service from the
right to sue to vindicate their injuries. 6 Certain circuits have even held that service
members and veterans are precluded from pursing a cause of action to vindicate
diseases contracted by their in utero infants, which are causally connected to a
service member parent’s exposure to health-harming toxins—including radiation—
while in service. 7
“Both academics and [the] lower [federal] courts have condemned the [Feres]
doctrine as unfounded, unfair, and even un-American.” 8 Moreover, the doctrine’s
unmooring from the plain language of the FTCA has provoked the ire of
prominent Supreme Court textualists. Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that
the plain language of the FTCA not only undermines Feres, it mandates the
opposite result insofar as it indicates that
Congress thought . . . barring recovery [for service members] might adversely
affect military discipline. After all, the morale of Lieutenant Commander
Johnson’s comrades-in-arms will not likely be boosted by news that his widow
and children will receive only a fraction of the amount they might have
recovered had he been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his
death. 9
Notwithstanding these persuasive critiques, Feres remains the law of the land and
continues to force veterans to seek the substandard remedies offered by the
dysfunctional VA service-connected disability benefits system, which is discussed
in greater detail below.

5. Popper, supra note 2, at 1495.
6. See, e.g., Klay v. Panetta, 924 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (barring the tort claim of a
former service member who suffered an in-service sexual assault pursuant to Feres), aff’d, 758 F.3d
369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
7. See, e.g., Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567, 568 (3d Cir. 1983) (barring a suit under
Feres brought on behalf of an infant whose “genetic injuries [were] caused by her father’s exposure to
radiation while he was on active duty in the United States Army” while “acknowledg[ing] the result
to be a harsh one”).
8. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign Immunity in
the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
9. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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III. THE RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
“[T]here has been significant dissatisfaction with the exercise of judicial
review functions [governing veterans’ claims].” 10
The United States also has an extensive history of depriving veterans of the
basic due process right to judicial review. Congress denied former service
members any independent judicial oversight of VA claims decisions until 1988,
when it enacted the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA) and, thereby, created
the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC). 11 Prior to the
establishment of the CAVC, veterans were proscribed from challenging VA claims
denial decisions—regardless of their illegality—because those agency
determinations were final and unreviewable. 12
VA staunchly opposed judicial oversight of the agency’s benefits decisions. 13
“VA’s most frequently voiced concern was that [such review] would impair its
long-standing, supportive, non[-]adversarial role in its relationship with
veterans.” 14 As provided in the next section, VA has repeatedly invoked the highly
debatable and self-serving argument that veterans must be deprived of basic due
process rights, including the right to judicial oversight of VA claims decisions and
attorney representation, in order to preserve the agency’s purportedly
paternalistic, pro-veteran, and non-adversarial benefits adjudication system. VA
also advanced several other reasons in support of its opposition to judicial
oversight, including the contention that such review would increase agency costs
and incentivize opportunistic attorneys to swindle veterans out of their welldeserved benefits. 15
It was no secret in Congress that VA’s long-standing immunity from judicial
review was aberrant in the federal system. A 1988 U.S. House of Representatives
Report expressly acknowledged that “the Veterans’ Administration stands in
‘splendid isolation as the single federal administrative agency whose major
functions are explicitly insulated from judicial review.’” 16 Unsurprisingly, and as
10. Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits
System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 303, 321 (2004).
11. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, tit. III, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113–22 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2018)).
12. Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 211(a), 71 Stat. 83, 92 (“[D]ecisions of
the Administrator on any question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under
any law administered by the Veterans Administration shall be final and conclusive and no other
official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
decision.”).
13. See, e.g., Hugh B. McClean, Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die: Balancing Veterans’ Rights and
Non-Adversarial Procedures in the VA Disability Benefits System, 72 SMU L. REV. 277, 288 (2019)
(explaining that “the VA vehemently opposed judicial oversight and, as one scholar put it, . . . was
brought ‘kicking and screaming’ into the realm of due process”); Levy, supra note 10, at 320.
14. Charles L. Cragin, The Impact of Judicial Review on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ Claims
Adjudication Process: The Changing Role of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, 46 ME. L. REV. 23, 26–27
(1994).
15. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters the Mission Is Clear, the Execution Is Muddled: A
Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Decision to Deny Veterans the Due Process Right to Hire Attorneys in the
VA Benefits Process, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 689–90 (2016).
16. H.R. REP. 100-963, at 10 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5791 (quoting
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Professor Michael Wishnie has wisely pointed out, such legal isolation operated
over time to undermine the civil rights and legal interests of veterans 17 while
protecting VA from public scrutiny and potential reform.
There is little doubt that subjecting VA claims decisions to judicial review was
a welcome improvement for veterans. In theory at least, Congress enacted such
oversight to ensure that VA follows its own rules throughout its administrative
benefits proceedings. The court that Congress created to adjudicate veteran
claims, however, is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction. As such, the CAVC’s
scope of review and peculiar procedures depart in critical ways from that of the
regional Article III appellate courts of general jurisdiction—frequently to the
detriment of veterans.
First, while the CAVC is technically an appellate court, its decisions are
reviewed by a separate intermediate appellate court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, before they are ripe for certiorari petition to the
United States Supreme Court.18 This structure, which demands that veterans
obtain at least two appellate court rulings before seeking review from the court of
last resort, is not only unusual—it is frustrating insofar as it adds another timeconsuming layer to a claims decision process that is already laborious, riddled with
error, and defined by delay. To make matters worse, veterans often have no right
whatsoever to appeal certain CAVC decisions as a result of the Federal Circuit’s
circumscribed appellate jurisdiction over VA claims, which is limited to reviewing
legal issues. 19 The Federal Circuit, for example, is expressly prohibited by statute
from considering a veteran’s challenge “to [a VA] factual determination” or “to a
[VA] law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 20
Second, the overwhelming majority of CAVC claims appeals are decided on
the paper record, without oral argument, and by a single judge. 21 Because singlejudge decisions are not precedential, 22 they leave “veteran claimants and the
agency . . . without binding guidance on how the law should be interpreted and
applied in different factual contexts, which, in turn, generates additional appeals
at both the agency and judicial levels.” 23 Even more concerning is a recent
empirical study which found that “the outcomes in [single-judge CAVC] cases
depend heavily upon which judge decides the appeal.” 24 Needless to say, a
Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans’ Benefits: A Preliminary
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 905 (1975)).
17. Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets in Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law
Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1709, 1709–10, 1712 (2017).
18. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2018).
19. Id. § 7292(c)–(d)
20. Id. § 7292(d)(2).
21. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 2,
5
(2018)
[hereinafter
CAVA
FY
2018
REPORT],
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2018AnnualReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/89APDF6U]; see also James D. Ridgway et al., “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with Single-Judge
Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 11 (2016) (explaining
that “in recent years, single-judge dispositions have come to dominate to a degree far greater than
non-precedential decisions used in the other federal courts of appeals”).
22. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b).
23. Ridgway et al., supra note 21, at 3.
24. Id.
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veteran’s right to service-connected benefits ought not hinge on the luck of that
veteran’s judicial draw in any given CAVC appeal.
Third, the CAVC is highly unlikely to resolve a veteran’s benefits claim appeal
on the merits. The court has the statutory authority to affirm, modify, or reverse
a VA claims determination, or to remand the case to VA for additional
development.25 Yet, the CAVC very rarely flexes its authority to render a final
decision. 26
In 2018, for example, the CAVC reversed and remanded non-extraordinary
relief cases to VA in whole or in part approximately 80% of the time, 27 which
matches the rate at which the court reversed and remanded those same types of
claims in 2008.28 Such astronomical remand rates are disturbing for at least two
reasons. Most obviously, they indicate that VA reached an inadequate or
erroneous result in approximately four out of five veterans claims it decided over
the most recent ten-year period for which claims data are available. Equally
concerning, the CAVC’s practice of remanding claims back to VA for do-overs—
instead of exercising its authority to modify or decide the appeal—exacerbates the
unconscionably lengthy periods of time it takes the agency to favorably decide and
implement veteran claim awards, which currently average 2,213 days, or more
than six years. 29
The CAVC’s habit of reversing and remanding claims back to the VA in lieu
of issuing final decisions “simply put[s] the aging veteran back on what has been
called the ‘hamster wheel’ of [VA] claims recycling” 30—a seemingly endless process
that veterans characterize as “Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die.” 31 By all accounts,
the VA claims process has earned this moniker. A recent VA Inspector General’s
report acknowledged that 1,100 American veterans with unresolved serviceconnected disability claims that had been pending before VA for more than a year
died in 2016 alone. 32 As Professor Wishnie wryly observed, “It is easy to justify
judicial review of veterans benefits claims, but it is difficult to defend the current
system.” 33

25. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
26. McClean, supra note 13, at 296 (noting that while the CAVC “has the power to modify or
reverse Board decisions, . . . it has used that power sparingly”).
27. CAVA FY 2018 REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
28. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS (1999–2008),
https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_-_20081.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XRHRNPQ].
29. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 16-01750-79, VETERANS
BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: REVIEW OF TIMELINESS OF THE APPEALS PROCESS 4 (2018)
[hereinafter VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT], https://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-16-01750-79.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UL7Z-JGQX].
30. James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is Needed to
Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 238 (2001).
31. McClean, supra note 13, at 277 (explaining that “‘Delay, Deny, Wait Till They Die’ . . . is a
battle cry for soldiers, sailors, and airmen who have long put aside their armaments but remain
entangled in the unending appeals process of the [VA] disability benefits system”).
32. VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 12.
33. Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1733.
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IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The above-described, due-process-depriving aspects of the veterans claims
judicial review regime are exacerbated by the federal law that denies veterans the
fundamental right to counsel during the initial stage of the VA claims process.
This Article contends that the law that denies our former service members the
basic right to representation is the single biggest challenge veterans face in the VA
system. Therefore, it advocates for either the repeal of the statute that limits a
veteran’s right to representation or an overturning of the Supreme Court’s 1985
decision in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, which upheld the
constitutionality of that law. 34 In order for the reader to thoroughly appreciate
the import of extending a right to counsel to veterans at the initial stage of the
VA claims process, however, it is imperative to first describe the ever-evolving and
increasingly complex VA service-connected disability claims process, detail the
country’s long history of denying veterans access to counsel in that system, and
explain and debunk the patronizing half-truths that VA continues to advance in
defense of the status quo.
A. THE VA SERVICE-CONNECTED DISABILITY BENEFITS SYSTEM
“Within the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), disabled veterans are
being retraumatized by an overburdened and dysfunctional benefits system
that Congress intended to be ‘veteran-friendly,’ but in fact prevents veterans
from obtaining the benefits they earned in service.” 35
State-sponsored legislative schemes designed to provide benefits to disabled
service members date back to at least sixteenth-century Elizabethan England. 36
Such American veteran compensation systems, which trace their roots to the
British regime, developed in response to colonial warmongering with indigenous
North Americans and, therefore, predate the founding of the United States. 37
“The evolution of the American system of veteran disability compensation is
closely tied to the evolution of American warfare and, as such, finds its ascendency
in the very first war the country fought as a nation.” 38 Indeed, the overwhelming
34. Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334 (1985), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C. (2018)).
35. McClean, supra note 13, at 280.
36. Geoffrey L. Hudson, Disabled Veterans and the State in Early Modern England, in DISABLED
VETERANS IN HISTORY 117, 117 (David A. Gerber ed., 2012).
37. H. COMM. ON VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., MEDICAL CARE OF VETERANS 2 (Comm.
Print 1967) (reporting that the 1593 English-disabled-veterans compensation scheme was “the
cornerstone of the entire structure of the American compensation and pension system, and Federal
care for disabled veterans, that came into being centuries later”); Jennifer D. Oliva, Son of Sam, ServiceConnected Entitlements, and Disabled Veteran Prisoners, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 302, 306–07 (2018)
(explaining that “the very first such law was ‘enacted in 1636 by Plymouth [and] provided money to
those disabled in the colony’s defense against [the Pequot] Indians’” (alterations in original) (quoting
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
VA
HISTORY
IN
BRIEF
3,
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LA4T-U4AH])).
38. Oliva, supra note 37, at 307.
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majority of major developments in veterans law were enacted during or preceding
significant American conflicts as a result of veteran dissatisfaction with the thenin-place system.
Congress established the Bureau of Pensions—the first federal department
authorized to administer veteran disability benefits and a precursor to VA—in
1833. 39 The ensuing Civil War era marked the rise of powerful veterans’ service
organizations, which successfully lobbied the federal government for enhanced
veterans’ benefits. 40 In 1862, for example, Congress enacted a statute that
compensated veterans for service-connected disabilities and diseases, granted
additional benefits for veterans’ dependents, and provided disability payments to
veterans with non-wartime service. 41 It was not until after the United States
entered World War I and reinstated the draft, however, that Congress created a
schedule to rate and compensate service-connected disabilities similar to the
current system administered by VA. 42
Under the modern regime, veterans are entitled to service-connected disability
compensation so long as they were discharged or released under conditions other
than dishonorable 43 and can establish that (1) they suffer a current disability; (2)
they experienced an in-service event; and (3) the in-service event either caused or
aggravated their current disability. 44 In response to widespread criticism of VA’s
then-existing claims adjudication process, 45 Congress enacted the Veterans
Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA). 46 The AMA
established a new VA disability claims process, which is examined below. Before
the AMA’s February 19, 2019 effective date, veterans were required to persist
through the VA’s legacy claims adjudication process (the legacy system), which the
agency itself has characterized as “complicated, opaque, [and] unpredictable.” 47
Under VA’s legacy benefits administration system, veterans were first required
39. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 37, at 4 (“When Congress authorized the
establishment of the Bureau of Pensions in 1833, it was the first administrative unit dedicated solely
to the assistance of veterans. The new Bureau of Pensions was administered from 1833 to 1840 as
part of the Department of War, and from 1840 to 1849 as the Office of Pensions under the Navy
Secretary. The office then was assigned to the new Department of the Interior, and renamed the
Bureau of Pensions.”).
40. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING
VETERANS FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 96 (Michael McGeary et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IOM
REPORT]; Levy, supra note 10, at 310 (“The Civil War, which left many veterans severely wounded,
marked a significant expansion of benefits, as the size of the veteran population and the problems
they faced forced Congress to become more involved and to initiate new programs.”); McClean, supra
note 13, at 285 (discussing the “high remand rates of the Board and the Veterans Court”).
41. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566; see IOM REPORT, supra note 40, at 95–96.
42. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-90, §§ 301–02, 40 Stat. 398, 405–06.
43. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2018); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2019).
44. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131.
45. Legislative Hearing on: H.R. 3216, H.R. 4150, H.R. 4764, H.R. 5047, H.R. 5083, H.R. 5162,
H.R. 5166, H.R. 5392, H.R. 5407, H.R. 5416, H.R. 5420, H.R. 5428: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Veterans’ Affairs, 114th Cong. 40 (2016) [hereinafter Legislative Hearing] (testimony of Sloan Gibson,
Deputy Secretary for the Department of Veterans Affairs).
46. Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-55, 131
Stat. 1105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
47. Stacey-Rae Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 U. KAN. L.
REV. 513, 548 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Legislative Hearing, supra note 45,
at 18 (statement of Sloan Gibson, Deputy Secretary for the Department of Veterans Affairs)).
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to file an initial claim with one of the VA’s fifty-six regional offices (VAROs). 48 A
VARO employee, who is not required to have any formal legal training, would
then decide the veteran’s claim. A veteran dissatisfied with the VARO’s decision
could appeal the claim by filing a Notice of Disagreement (NOD). 49 The VARO,
thereafter, was required to respond to the NOD with a Statement of the Case
(SOC), which provided the veteran a more detailed explanation concerning the
VARO’s claim decision. 50 In 2016, it took the VAROs an average of 408 days to
issue a SOC explaining its own previously issued claims decision. 51
The legacy system required veterans unsatisfied with their SOC to appeal their
claim to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) by filing a VA Form 9. 52 The
Board—which is staffed exclusively with VA employees—was then responsible for
issuing a claims decision. 53 Although the Board is authorized to make a final
determination on any veteran’s claim, it, instead, remands approximately threequarters of the appeals that it decides 54 back to the VARO due to error during
the initial claims decision proceedings. 55
A Board remand effectively amounts to a redo of the hamster wheel-like VA
claims cycle, restarting it at the VARO-claims-decision stage of the process. As a
recent GAO report reveals, “[V]eterans waited an average of 3 years from the date
they initiated their appeal to resolution by either VBA or the Board—and a
cumulative average of 7 years for appeals resolved by the Board” in fiscal year
2017. 56 Once the Board issues a final decision, the veteran can appeal the claim
to the CAVC, 57 which, as previously explained, remands approximately 80% of
the non-emergency petition claims it reviews back to the Board for further
proceedings. 58
The AMA’s purpose is to reduce the extravagant VA claims backlog and to
expedite the claims decision process for veterans. To VA’s credit, the agency took
the position during the AMA congressional hearings that its legacy claims
adjudication process was broken and ought to be revamped. VA, in fact, conceded

48. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107(a), 5110(a); 38 C.F.R. § 19.24.
49. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a)–(b)(1)(C).
50. 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.26(d), 19.29.
51. VA IG TIMELINESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 4.
52. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).
53. Id.
54. Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law, supra note 47, at 528 (“In 2017, the Board remanded
or reversed 73% of the appeals of Regional Office decisions.”).
55. Catherine Trombley, The Appeals Process: When an Appeal Is Remanded, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERANS’
AFFAIRS:
VANTAGE
POINT
(Feb.
24,
2016,
11:00
AM),
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/26013/the-appeals-process-remands/ [https://perma.cc/3VL6ZYUG] (“In VA’s circular system, appeals are remanded for many reasons. A remand may be
necessary if there has been a change in law, a worsening of a disability on appeal or the Veteran
introduces new evidence or theory of entitlement at the Board.”).
56. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-352, VA DISABILITY BENEFITS: IMPROVED
PLANNING PRACTICES WOULD BETTER ENSURE SUCCESSFUL APPEALS REFORM 1 (2018) (emphasis
added).
57. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a).
58. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS APPEALS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2018, at 14 fig., https://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2018AR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LXK-32H5] [hereinafter VA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018].

COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

112

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 73:103

that the system had devolved into a “complicated, opaque, unpredictable and less
veteran-friendly” process that “makes adversaries out of veterans and [the] VA”
and “is ridiculously slow.” 59 Veterans who filed their claims prior to the AMA’s
February 19, 2019 effective date may remain in the legacy system or opt into the
AMA process upon receipt of a SOC. 60
The AMA departs from the legacy system process upon the veteran’s receipt of
the initial VARO claims decision and, thereafter, provides three different
pathways to pursue an appeal. First, a veteran can seek a higher-level, de novo
review of the claim at the VARO within one year of the initial decision on the
record evidence. 61 This pathway varies significantly from the legacy system, which
permits veterans to submit new evidence during the pendency of any appeal.
Second, the veteran can submit a NOD requesting Board review of the claim. 62
This pathway eliminates the legacy system’s threshold requirements that the
VARO provides a SOC and the veteran completes a VA Form 9 in order to perfect
a Board appeal. Finally, a veteran can submit a “supplemental claim” if the initial
VARO decision is more than a year old or if the veteran has received a decision
by the higher-level authority, the Board or the CAVC, within a year. 63 This
pathway requires a veteran to submit “new and relevant evidence,” and, if the
veteran elects this option once a year has passed since the VA or CAVC has made
the at-issue claims decision, the benefits effective date (the date a veteran is
deemed eligible for compensation) shifts from the earlier date of filing the initial
claim to the later date of filing the supplemental claim to the veteran’s
detriment. 64
Once a veteran’s appeal is perfected before the Board, the AMA, again,
provides veterans with a trifecta of distinct options. Veterans who elect the first
pathway are entitled to a hearing before the Board with the concomitant right to
submit additional evidence for the Board’s consideration. 65 Veterans who choose
the second pathway are permitted to submit additional evidence to the Board but
must forfeit any hearing. 66 Finally, veterans may opt to permit the Board to decide
their appeal on the record but, in so doing, forfeit their hearing and the
submission of any additional evidence for the Board’s review. 67
B. VETERAN RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL LIMITATIONS: HISTORY AND BASES
“[N]onadversarial procedures depart dramatically from our usual conception
59. Legislative Hearing, supra note 45, at 18 (statement of Sloan Gibson, Deputy Secretary for the
Department of Veterans Affairs).
60. Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-55, §
2(x)(5), 131 Stat. 1105, 1115 (codified as 38 U.S.C. § 101 note (Effective and Applicability
Provisions)).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 5104B(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (d)–(e).
62. Id. §§ 5104C(a)(1)(C), 7105(b)(1)(A).
63. Id. § 5104C(a)(1)(B), (b).
64. Id. §§ 5108(a), 5110(a)(3).
65. Id. §§ 7105(b)(3)(A), 7113(b)(1)–(2).
66. Id. §§ 7105(b)(3)(B), 7113(c)(1)–(2); see VA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 58, at 15
fig. (depicting the VA claims adjudication process under the AMA).
67. 8 U.S.C. §§ 7105(b)(3)(C), 7113(a).
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of due process and their fairness rests on the assumption that the system
truly operates in a pro-veteran manner.” 68
Statutory provisions proscribing a veteran’s right to counsel in veteran benefit
proceedings date back to the Civil War. In 1862, Congress enacted a law limiting
the fee that an attorney was permitted to charge a veteran for benefits-related
services to five dollars. 69 Two years later, on July 4, 1864, Congress increased that
cap to ten dollars, 70 where it remained unchanged for 124 years until the passage
of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act in 1988.71
As Army veteran and law professor Stacey-Rae Simcox has explained, the
primary impetus for the Civil War-era attorney fee limitation was congressional
concern about unscrupulous lawyers bilking unsuspecting veterans out of their
hard-earned entitlements. 72 Professor Simcox points to remarks provided by
Senator Edward Bragg of Wisconsin during an 1886 congressional debate about
veteran-widow pension legislation as axiomatic of “Congress[’s] . . . disdain for
attorneys in the 1860s to 1890s.” 73 She makes a powerful point. During that
debate, Senator Bragg characterized attorneys’ fees as “blood taken from the
soldiers whom they pretend to love.” 74 He went on to say: “[T]hese (attorneys) that
present to be ‘friends of soldiers’ are the friends of soldiers as vultures are the
friends of dead bodies—because they feed and fatten them. . . . They have the voice
of Jacob, but their hand has the clutch of Esau.” 75
In 1983, a group of veterans, veterans’ organizations, and a veteran’s widow
filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the $10
attorney fee limitation in National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters. 76 The
Walters plaintiffs contended that the fee cap effectively precluded them from
hiring qualified attorneys to advocate their VA service-connected disability and
death claims related to their in-service exposure to radiation and Agent Orange in
violation of their Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process and First
Amendment rights to free association and redress of grievances. 77
The district court analyzed the veterans’ Fifth Amendment procedural due
process claim under the three-pronged Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which
requires the weighing of the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of any
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
68. Levy, supra note 10, at 315–16.
69. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, § 6, 12 Stat. 566, 568.
70. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 12, 13 Stat. 387, 389.
71. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)–(d)).
72. Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note 15, at 681–85.
73. Id. at 682.
74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY
PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 214 (David Kinley ed., 1918)).
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GLASSON, supra note 74, at 214).
76. 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
77. Id. at 1306, 1310.

COPYRIGHT © 2020 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

114

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 73:103

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 78
With regard to the first Mathews prong, the district court determined that “[t]he
veterans’ interest in obtaining service-connected death and disability benefits is
extremely high.” 79 It based that ruling in part on the fact that “the VA claims
procedure is the veterans’ sole remedy against the government [because] [t]hey
cannot sue for disabilities stemming from their military service under the Federal
Torts Claims Act” as a result of the Feres doctrine.80
The district court next held that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the
veterans’ significant interest in obtaining VA disability and death benefits was
substantial without adequate attorney representation. In reaching that result, the
court made at least two findings supported by the record that are worth
highlighting. First, it explained that “[t]he undisputed factual evidence submitted
by the plaintiffs in th[e] case show[ed] that both the procedures and the substance
entailed in presenting [service-connected death and disability] claims to the VA
[we]re extremely complex.” 81
Procedurally claimants are faced with an interplay between the following:
statutes; regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations; the
Procedural Manual M-21-1; the BVA Manual; the Program Guide; the Filed
Appellate Procedures Manual M1-1; adjudication memoranda; VA circulars;
informal memoranda; and BVA decisions. The interrelationship between
these various rules is so complex that one VA adjudication officer . . .
developed his own personal cross-index on file cards in an attempt to master
the complexity. . . .
Veterans’ failure to comply with the VA’s procedural regulations may
result in denial of their claims. . . .
Claims for service-connected death and disability benefits often turn on
very complicated substantive analyses as well. The determination of the
degree of disability frequently rests on a difficult medical analysis, and proof
of service connection may raise causation issues which require both
medically and legally complex analyses. . . .
Often, to make a convincing claim, veterans or their families have to
gather and present vast amounts of factual information regarding both the
medical nature of the veteran’s illness and also the circumstances which
might have given rise to that illness. . . . Adequate preparation of such claims
may often require hundreds of hours of work, and will in many cases
necessitate obtaining expert testimony. 82
The court also flatly rejected the VA’s age-old, go-to argument in support of its
consistent opposition to the extension of basic legal rights to former service
members: that is, that permitting veterans to hire counsel would undermine the
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1314 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1319–20 (citations omitted).
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agency’s pro-claimant, informal, and non-adversarial benefits adjudication system.
The record before the court sorely undermined that contention, demonstrating
not only that VA frequently failed to assist veterans but often actively encouraged
them to abandon important procedural rights. 83 “[G]iven . . . VA’s apparent
inability to protect a claimant’s interests as fully as might that claimant’s personal
paid attorney, both claimants and attorneys familiar with the VA system view that
system as adversarial, despite the contrary description [provided by VA
regulations].” 84
The district court then took up its analysis of the third Mathews factor: the
government’s interest in maintaining the $10 attorney fee cap. The court held
that VA had “failed to demonstrate that it would suffer any harm if the statutory
fee limitation, in existence in some form since 1862, were lifted.” 85 The court
went on to note that the only harm that VA even proffered that it would suffer
should the fee limitation be eliminated was its self-appointed position as “the
paternalistic protector of claimants’ supposed best interests.” 86 Consequently, the
district court issued a nationwide injunction on the attorney fee limitation, which
the purportedly pro-veteran VA promptly appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.
VA made several now-familiar arguments in its campaign to convince the high
court to keep $10 attorney fee cap in place. First, the agency contended that “the
presence of retained counsel is not necessary to a fair procedure” because of VA’s
“informal and non[-]adversarial claims system for processing veterans’ benefits, in
which the VA is responsible for assisting veterans to establish their claims.” 87
Second, VA insisted permitting veterans to hire counsel was unnecessary because
veterans had the right to seek the assistance of non-law-trained veteran service
organization (VSO) personnel “to provide . . . representation to veterans without
charge.” 88 Finally, the agency maintained—without citation to any support—that
“the fee limit ensures that veterans’ benefits are not depleted through payments
to counsel and that veterans are protected from overreaching and unscrupulous
attorneys.” 89
Appellant American G.I. Forum, the nation’s “largest Hispanic veteran’s
organization,” responded to VA by asserting that
The government’s euphoric and sanitized description of the [agency’s]
alleged “non-adversarial” system is in conflict with the record below and is
an elaborate legal camouflage of a reality that no court, particularly this
court, can or should ignore.

83. See id. at 1320–21.
84. Id. at 1321 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted).
86. Id.
87. Brief for Appellants at 15, Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305
(1985) (No. 84-571), 1985 WL 669992, at *15.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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....
. . . None of the more than six thousand Agent Orange cases and only
one percent (15 of 2,000) of atomic radiation cases [submitted to VA] have
been adjudicated in favor of the [veteran]. 90
Numerous organizations intervened on appeal as amici curiae in support of the
veteran appellees, including the Federal Bar Association, which contended:
No legitimate Governmental interest compels shutting the VA door to
retained counsel. Appellants’ suggestion that, because these benefits are
assertedly “gratuities,” the Constitution should tolerate an “experiment”
that fails to comport with due process, or other Constitutional norms, is an
argument long ago rejected by this Court. The paternalistic notion that
proceeding without legal advice is really in the veteran’s best interest is
punctured when the system as it actually operates is examined and the
“claimed benefits [are] candidly appraised.” The Government’s other
asserted interests—that there is some worth in keeping the proceedings
informal and that veterans and their survivors must be protected from
unscrupulous lawyers—simply do not warrant the draconian measure of
restricting access to retained counsel. If informality is desirable, it need not
be incompatible with legal representation. 91
Federal Bar counsel went on to emphasize what the extensive district court
record and VA regulations proved: “[T]hat the VA’s supposed paternalism does
not inure to the veterans’ best interests” and “in view of the mandate that VA
employees may assist veterans to develop their claims ‘while protecting the interests
of the Government,’ the VA personnel possess a divided loyalty assuring that the
VA cannot fully serve the best interests of the applicants.” 92 The National
Association of Atomic Veterans pressed a similar argument, asserting that VA’s
attempt to maintain the attorney fee limitation
[S]imply by dubbing [its] process “informal” and “nonadversarial” not only
distorts the facts, but fundamentally misconceives the nature of the problem.
Regardless of the degree of formality of V.A. hearings, the burden of proof
is on the applicant, and if he fails to develop and present available evidence
due to ignorance or incapacity, the proof fails, even in the absence of an
“adversary.” 93
These contentions, however, fell on deaf ears. Notwithstanding the record
evidence, the Supreme Court adopted VA’s arguments in toto and held, in a 6–3
decision, that the attorney fee limitation comported with a veteran’s Fifth

90. Brief for Intervenor-Appellee American G.I. Forum at 1, 6–8, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No.
84-571), 1985 WL 669996, at *1, *6–8 (citations omitted).
91. Brief for the Federal Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 6–7, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No. 84-571),
1985 WL 670015, at *6–7 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 21 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
93. Brief for the National Ass’n of Atomic Veterans as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees
at 15–16, Walters, 473 U.S. 305 (No. 84-571), 1985 WL 670021, at *15–16 (citations omitted).
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Amendment right to due process. 94 In so doing, the Court pointed to several
aspects of the VA disability claims process that it characterized as inherently proveteran and non-adversarial, such as the ex parte nature of the proceedings before
the Board, which do not include a government lawyer; VA’s obligation to both
“assist [a veteran] in developing the facts pertinent to his claim” and give the
veteran the benefit of the doubt—that is, grant a veteran’s claim when the evidence
is in equipoise; and lack of imposition of any statute of limitations or res judicata
effect on veterans’ claims. 95
Writing for the majority, then-Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on statistics that
showed that (1) only “a tiny fraction” of veterans claims are properly characterized
as “‘complex’ cases,” and (2) veterans represented by pro bono counsel before the
Board were only marginally more successful than those represented by non-lawtrained VSOs on appeal. 96 Justice Rehnquist further asserted that the Court owed
deference to the legislative concern about attorney fee-splitting even though he
acknowledged Congress’s on-the-record concession that “the original stated
interest in protecting veterans from unscrupulous lawyers was ‘no longer
tenable.’” 97 The Walters majority concluded by adopting VA’s argument that the
introduction of lawyers to its claims adjudication system would make VA’s
informal, pro-claimant process more adversarial: “[E]ven apart from the
frustration of Congress’ principal goal of wanting the veteran to get the entirety
of the award, the destruction of the fee limitation would bid fair to complicate a
proceeding which Congress wished to keep as simple as possible.” 98 In a blistering
dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that,
[R]egardless of the nature of the dispute between the sovereign and the
citizen—whether it be a criminal trial, a proceeding to terminate parental
rights, a claim for social security benefits, a dispute over welfare benefits, or
a pension claim asserted by the widow of a soldier who was killed on the
battlefield—the citizen’s right to consult an independent lawyer and to retain
that lawyer to speak on his or her behalf is an aspect of liberty that is
priceless. 99
Three years after the Supreme Court decided Walters, Congress repealed the
$10 attorney fee limitation and replaced it with a statute that permitted veterans
to hire attorneys for a reasonable fee—but not until the Board had reached a final
decision on the veteran’s claim and the evidentiary record was closed. 100 Congress
has since adjusted the rule that controls a veteran’s right to hire an attorney during
the VA claims adjudication process on several occasions. Under current law,
veterans are entitled to pro bono attorney assistance at all stages of the VA claims
process. Veterans remain prohibited, however, from hiring counsel to represent
94. Walters, 473 U.S. at 334.
95. Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1984)).
96. Id. at 330–31.
97. Id. at 322 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-466, at 50 (1982)).
98. Id. at 326.
99. Id. at 371 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 104, 102 Stat. 4105, 4108 (1988)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)–(d) (2018)).
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them in VA proceedings until after a VARO has reached a decision on their claim
and the veteran files an NOD.101 In other words, veterans remain barred by statute
from hiring an attorney to assist them during the initial claims stage in the VA
benefits system.
V. RECOMMENDED REFORM: A VETERAN RIGHT-TO-COUNSEL AT
ALL STAGES OF THE VA CLAIMS ADJUDICATION PROCESS
“The absence of legal representation does not benefit veterans.” 102
This Article advocates for the extension of the fundamental right to counsel to
veterans at all stages of the VA claims process. This reform can be accomplished
in one of two ways: either the Supreme Court can overturn Walters, or Congress
can repeal the statute that prohibits veterans from hiring an attorney until the
appellate stage of the VA claims adjudication process. This proposal is supported
by both an army of good reasons and numerous legal experts, many of whom are
themselves either veterans or veterans’ advocates. 103
First, Walters was difficult to defend at the time it was decided. As explained
above, the Supreme Court was persuaded that permitting veterans to hire
attorneys in agency proceedings would disrupt the purportedly non-adversarial,
pro-claimant VA claims process. The Court reached that conclusion, however, by
largely ignoring the record evidence, which was unrefuted by VA and established
that (1) the VA adjudication system was so procedurally and substantively complex
that even seasoned attorneys deemed the scheme extraordinarily complicated to
navigate; (2) VSOs lacked the expertise and resources to provide adequate
representation to veterans in those complex proceedings; (3) VA not only
frequently neglected to satisfy its duty to assist veterans with their claims, it
encouraged veterans to waive important rights throughout the proceedings; and
(4) VA’s contention that its claims adjudication was non-adversarial was suspect
because VA regulations expressly stated that VA employees were obligated to
protect the interests of the government. Moreover, and even assuming arguendo
that Walters properly characterized the VA claims process as pro-veteran and nonadversarial, VA failed to advance any reasonable rationale as to why such a veteranfriendly system would be hampered—instead of helped—by permitting veterans to
hire counsel to ensure that VA fulfills its duties to veterans when evaluating and
adjudicating their service-related entitlement claims.
Second, while Walters was most likely wrongly decided in 1985, the decision is
impossible to avow today. It is uncontroversial that the VA claims adjudication
process has become increasingly adversarial and complex since the mid-1980s. Just
three years after Walters was issued, in fact, Congress enacted the VJRA, which
both mandated judicial oversight of VA claims decisions for the first time in
American history and repealed the $10 attorney fee limitation in favor of a rule
101. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1).
102. Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1721.
103. See, e.g., McClean, supra note 13, at 307–16; Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note
15, at 731–35; Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1730–41.
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that permitted veterans to hire an attorney after the Board issued its initial
decision. The VJRA, therefore, “struck at the core of the non-adversarial
system.” 104
Several of the qualities of the VA system on which the Walters Court relied in
concluding that the claims adjudication process is “pro-veteran” and “nonadversarial” have been proven either nonexistent or illusory since 1985. For
example, while there was scant record evidence to support the Supreme Court’s
determination that the VA claims process was “simple” to navigate thirty-five years
ago, there is no proof whatsoever that such is the case today. 105 “VA benefits
involve a lengthy and confusing statutory scheme, implemented through
hundreds of pages of regulations and sub-regulatory agency guidelines, and often
turning on assessment of conflicting medical information.” 106 Myriad experts have
opined on the ever-increasing complexity of the VA benefits process, and some
have even attributed the VA’s extravagant decisional error rates at both the VARO
and the Board stages of the process to system complexity. 107 Perhaps most telling,
even the CAVC has described VA regulations as “a confusing tapestry for the
adjudication of claims.” 108
Walters also pointed to the agency’s “veteran-friendly canons,” which impose
on VA the duties to assist veterans to develop their claims 109 and to extend to
them the benefit of the doubt in the adjudication process 110 as evidence that the
VA system is non-adversarial. The duty to assist requires VA to help veterans
obtain their military and medical records 111 as well as provide veterans a medical
assessment pertinent to their claim, which VA calls a “compensation and
pension” (C&P) examination. 112 VA, however, has long been criticized for failing
to fulfill its duty to assist veterans. 113
As Air Force veteran and law professor Hugh McClean has expounded,
“Violations of the duty to assist are common . . . and are often the basis for
remands from the Board and [CAVC].” 114 VA’s track record on “assisting”
veterans to obtain their service and medical records is so poor that the leading
treatise on veterans law flatly states that “[a]dvocates simply cannot rely upon the
104. McClean, supra note 13, at 288; see also id. at 307 (explaining that “[s]ince the
implementation of judicial review in 1988, Congress has marched steadily toward a more legalistic
and technical administrative system for adjudicating benefits”).
105. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).
106. Wishnie, supra note 17, at 1739.
107. Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note 15, at 731.
108. Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 164, 167 (1991). One CAVC judge has gone so far as
to say that “[t]here is an unfortunate—and not entirely unfounded—belief that veterans law is
becoming too complex for the thousands of regional office adjudicators that must apply the rules on
the front lines in over a million cases per year.” DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (2011)
(Lance, J., concurring).
109. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(1)–(4), 21.1032(a)–(c) (2019).
110. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1991).
111. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(c)(1)–(2) (2018).
112. Id. § 5103A(d)(1)–(2); VA Claim Exam (C&P Exam), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
https://va.gov/disability/va-claim-exam [https://perma.cc/JGB9-9JFY] (last updated Feb. 7, 2020).
113. Levy, supra note 10, at 317 (contending that “one of the most frequently lodged criticisms
of the VA relates to its alleged failure to fulfill [its] duty to assist” veterans).
114. McClean, supra note 13, at 286.
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VA to assist in gathering the necessary evidence on a claim.” 115 Moreover, VARO
adjudicators concede that VA C&P examinations are subpar, and 56% of these
adjudicators in a recent poll contended that inadequate medical exams made it
challenging to decide veterans claims.116 VA also has acknowledged that “[t]he
[in]adequacy of medical examinations and opinions, such as those with
incomplete findings or supporting rationale for an opinion, has remained one of
the most frequent reasons for remand” because they constitute a violation of the
duty to assist. 117 VA has been similarly—and frequently—criticized for failing to
follow the veteran-benefit-of-the-doubt canon faithfully. 118
Worse yet, VA recently—and successfully—lobbied Congress to enact
limitations on its duty to assist veterans. Under the VA’s legacy claims system, VA
was obligated to assist a veteran throughout its administrative adjudicative
proceedings—from the initial claims stage until the Board made a final
determination on the veteran’s claim. Under the recently effective AMA,
however, the VA’s duty to assist terminates upon the veteran’s receipt of the initial
VARO claim decision. 119 This watered-down version of a long-standing, “veteransfriendly” canon of VA law marks a clear move toward a more adversarial process
and directly implicates the validity of Walters. As Professor Simcox has explained,
“One of the apprehensions with this [restriction] on the duty to assist is that due
to the limitation on when veterans may hire legal counsel, most veterans will not
have the benefit of [hiring] an attorney before choosing [one of the three AMA
pathways] of appeal.” 120
VA, in fact, has demonstrated a troubling pattern of backpedaling on its duty
to assist in additional ways in order to ease its claims-administration burden since
the Court decided Walters. In 2014, for example, VA implemented a new rule
that formalized the claims process by requiring veterans to execute particular
forms in order to initiate a claim and thereby preserve their “effective date”—the
date on which they are entitled to VA compensation benefits. 121 Under the pre2014 rules and in keeping with the alleged non-adversarial, “veteran-friendly”
nature of the VA claims process, veterans were permitted to commence their
claims and informally preserve the claims’ effective dates by sending something as
simple as a handwritten note to VA. 122 “The advent of newly required forms to
file . . . claims that eat away at advantages to the veteran and attempt to shift
burdens to the veteran ‘to speed things up’ are examples of the needle moving
115. O’Reilly, supra note 30, at 232 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting BARTON F. STICHMAN ET AL., VETERANS BENEFIT MANUAL § 1.1.2 (1999)).
116. McClean, supra note 13, at 293–94.
117. Why Are Veterans Waiting Years on Appeal? A Review of the Post-Decision Process for Appealed
Veterans’ Disability Benefits Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem’l Affairs
of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 113th Cong. 26 (2013) (statement of Laura H. Eskanazi, Principal
Deputy Vice Chairman, Board of Veterans’ Appeals).
118. Levy, supra note 10, at 316 (“But notwithstanding frequent proclamations of the pro-veteran
character of the [VA] system, a common criticism of the benefits process is that VA does not really
give the benefit of the doubt to claimants.”).
119. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(e)(1) (2018).
120. Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law, supra note 47, at 556–57.
121. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(b)(1)–(6) (2019).
122. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2013).
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towards a less veteran-friendly environment than was envisioned by the [Walters]
Court.” 123
Third, the egregious and ever-increasing length of time it takes VA to make a
final determination on veterans’ claims as a result of the agency’s exasperatingly
high decisional error rate is reason—standing alone—to permit veterans to hire
counsel at the inception of the claims process. In 2017, the CAVC remanded
86% of the appeals it decided on the merits back to VA as a result of Board
error. 124 During the same time period, the Board remanded 73% of appeals it
decided to a VARO due to agency error in the initial claims process. 125
This system—riddled with decisional error and dominated by a seemingly
endless cycle of remands—requires veterans to wait seven years on average in order
to receive a final benefits decision from VA. 126 Disturbingly, thousands of our
most vulnerable veterans die every year while waiting for a VA claims decision. As
VA’s own adjudication-related statistics prove, “In terms of making timely and
accurate compensation determinations, the VA sets low standards, and
consistently fails to meet them.” 127 The seven-year delay between the date a veteran
files an initial claim and the date that veteran receives a final VA claims decision
constitutes an unconscionable deprivation of due process and, without regard to
any of the other issues raised in this Article, demands that veterans be permitted
to hire an attorney to advocate on their behalf throughout the egregiously
inadequate VA claims adjudication system.
Finally, and for any remaining skeptics, there is good support for the argument
that the injection of attorneys at the initial stage of VA proceedings could help
reduce costs. First, attorneys could help filter frivolous claims out of the system by
fulfilling their ethical duties under the rules of professional responsibility.128
Second, VA-derived empirical evidence supports the argument that permitting
veterans to hire attorneys at the initial stage of VA claims proceedings would
reduce the extravagant costs associated with the VA’s high rate of claim
determination errors. 129 As Army veteran and attorney Benjamin Wright has
argued:
The rationale for proscribing attorney involvement was that if veterans had
attorneys then so would the VA, and costs and time would increase.
However, an equally strong argument can be made that lawyers would draft
clear, complete, accurate claims with the legal framework in mind, and
would thus assist VARO officials in reaching the correct disability
compensation determination the first time. In doing so, attorneys would
123. Simcox, Thirty Years After Walters, supra note 15, at 732.
124. Simcox, Thirty Years of Veterans Law, supra note 47, at 528.
125. Id.
126. McClean, supra note 13, at 284.
127. Benjamin W. Wright, It’s All About the Money: Denying Disabled Veterans the Right to an
Attorney, 6 NAELA J. 203, 209 (2010).
128. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.”).
129. Wright, supra note 127, at 211.
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help reduce the overall cost of the process and the amount of time it takes
to adjudicate a claim. 130
Relying on the Board’s fiscal year 2008 statistics, Mr. Wright determined that
“attorneys achieve a positive outcome for their . . . veteran clients more than any
other form of representation” because veterans represented by attorneys were
5.6% more likely to succeed on their claims than veterans represented by VSOs. 131
The Board’s fiscal year 2018 statistics are even more compelling: veterans
represented by attorneys were nearly 9% more likely to succeed on their claims
than their counterparts represented by VSOs. 132
VI. CONCLUSION
Fundamental legal rights enjoyed by virtually all Americans—including the right
to vindicate the federal government’s tortious conduct, the right to robust judicial
review, and the right to hire counsel at all stages of legal proceedings—are directly
attributable to the immense sacrifices that our veterans have made on behalf of
the nation. There is, therefore, no justification for the federal government’s
ongoing refusal to extend those basic rights to veterans. Instead of participating
in culturally popular, cosmetic gestures—such as saluting veterans at local sporting
events or thanking them for their service—this Article implores all Americans who
truly appreciate veteran service and sacrifice to lobby their congressional
delegations to repeal the law that denies veterans the right to hire counsel at all
stages of the increasingly complex and adversarial VA claims adjudication
proceedings and, thereby, deprives veterans of their best chance to realize their
hard-earned, service-connected entitlements.

130. Id. at 211 (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 216.
132. VA ANNUAL REPORT FY 2018, supra note 58, at 31.

